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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF “IDEAL 
VICTIMS”: ASSAULTED WOMEN’S “IMAGE PROBLEMS” IN LAW 
MELANIE RANDALL* 
In large part, the limits of current legal responses [to battered women] are 
rooted in the same persistent structural inequities and biases which underlie 
battering itself.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A significant amount of public attention and legal intervention in the past 
few decades has focused on the issue of violence against women and children, 
and especially on domestic violence.  This attention and increased public 
concern is a direct achievement of several decades of activism, scholarship, 
and advocacy undertaken by those concerned both with ending violence 
against women and achieving equality rights for women generally.2  Yet most 
mainstream social and legal responses to the problem of violence against 
women, especially violence against women in intimate relationships, remain 
inextricably bound up with and shaped by incomplete and distorted 
representations of the nature, causes, and effects of that violence.3  As a result, 
some of the ways domestic violence is addressed in the law – even those ways 
expressly aimed at remedying the defects and inadequacies of traditional legal 
responses – inadvertently end up reinforcing the problems they seek to rectify. 
Two examples of this are found in stereotypical representations of women 
who are subjected to violence in their intimate relationships.  Both of these 
representations rely on the construction of categories of victims of domestic 
violence that misapprehend and stigmatize women’s ways of coping with 
 
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, and Scotiabank Professor, Centre for Research on 
Violence Against Women and Children, University of Western Ontario.  I would like to thank the 
editors, in particular John M. Challis, of Saint Louis University Public Law Review for the 
invitation to contribute to this issue and for their excellent assistance with finalizing this 
manuscript.  Thanks also to Dr. Lori Haskell and Professor Dale Ives for their helpful comments 
and to Angela McCallum and Yola Hamzo for research assistance. 
 1. Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Women Syndrome to 
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 979 (1995). 
 2. See id. at 976-77. 
 3. Id. at 979-80. 
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intimate violence and its effects on their lives.4  The first of these is the legal 
deployment of the victim who suffers from the “battered woman syndrome,” a 
diagnostic category sometimes used as evidentiary support for the self-defence 
claims of women who, in fear for their own lives, have killed their violent 
partners.  It is specifically drawn upon to address the often asked question 
about why assaulted women who have ended up killing their violent spouses 
did not “just leave” their abusers instead.5  The second is the victim who 
recants and/or who refuses to “cooperate” in the prosecution of her violent 
male intimate.6 
Both of these categories of domestic violence “victims” share a set of 
problematic assumptions about how women who have experienced intimate 
violence typically react.  They share, most fundamentally, a failure to 
recognize that the decisions made by assaulted women who kill their violent 
partners to save their own lives, and those who refuse to “cooperate” with 
criminal prosecutions of their batterers, may be making decisions which are 
both reasonable and rational when grasped within the particular circumstances 
of their lives and the social conditions which shape those circumstances.7  
Most importantly, these representations of domestic violence “victims” reveal 
fundamental discordances between the way in which domestic violence is 
understood and processed in criminal justice system and the way in which it is 
lived and negotiated in the context of assaulted women’s lives.8 
In this paper, I argue that the use of the “battered woman syndrome” in law 
represents a double-edged sword.  To the extent that it captures the 
psychological dimensions and harms inflicted by being subjected to violence in 
an intimate relationship, the “syndrome” has provided critical evidence 
supporting the self-defence claims of battered women who kill their violent 
partners.  But to the extent it explains the difficulties battered women have 
leaving their violent partners in terms of a purported psychological incapacity 
and lacks an acknowledgment of the powerful social forces which inhibit 
women’s very opportunities for “leaving,” the “syndrome” is a profoundly 
inadequate conceptualization.  Given that there are more effective strategies for 
educating courts about the contexts and effects of intimate violence, I argue 
 
 4. See id. at 1000; see, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the 
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 589-90 (1999). 
 5. Stark, supra note 1, at 973, 981. 
 6. Mills, supra note 4, at 590. 
 7. See generally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (discussing the difficulty of 
encouraging a more public response to domestic violence while preserving women’s autonomy 
from excessive state intervention). 
 8. See generally id.; Mills, supra note 4 (discussing the need to reconsider whether 
mandatory state intervention policies serve the best interest of all battered women). 
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that the use of the “battered woman syndrome” ought ultimately to be 
abandoned in the legal arena. 
In the same way that the “battered woman syndrome” is an inadequate and 
distorted conceptualization of intimate violence in women’s lives, there is a 
distinct impression, backed up by an academic literature on the subject, that 
many assaulted women are “uncooperative victims” in relation to the criminal 
justice system’s processing of domestic violence cases.9  Some researchers 
and, more prominently, many Crown attorneys, prosecutors, and judges 
express frustration with women who refuse to participate in the prosecution of 
domestic violence cases, recant while testifying, or otherwise impede the 
criminal prosecution of domestic violence cases.10  But the idea that 
“uncooperative victims” are part of the problem in legal responses to domestic 
violence represents a failure to grasp the dynamics and impact of domestic 
violence in women’s lives.  Moreover, it rests on an undisturbed assumption 
that the women who have experienced violence in their intimate relationships 
should be invested in – and therefore “cooperate” with – the process of 
criminalization, in support of the state’s pursuit of this strategy. 
The category of the “uncooperative victim” differs from the “battered 
woman syndrome” insofar as it is not an academically developed 
psychological descriptor of the impact of violence but is, instead, a (negative) 
characterization of a common response that some assaulted have to the 
criminal justice system.11  Along with the “battered woman syndrome,” 
however, the concept of the “uncooperative victim” in domestic violence cases 
has gained currency and legitimacy in legal circles.12  However, both illustrate 
an inadequate understanding of intimate violence and its effects on women’s 
lives, particularly the effects associated with victimization and the social 
conditions of inequality in which domestic violence takes place.  To this 
extent, each of these “victim” categories typifies the kind of “image problem” 
that battered women face in law.13 
Dominant images and legal representations of women who are victims of 
violence typically fail to apprehend the co-existence of women’s victimization 
with women’s agency that is often expressed through the context specific 
strategies of resistance which most women employ when they experience 
violence perpetrated against them.14  A consequence of this analytical severing 
 
 9. See Mills, supra note 4, at 589-90.  See also Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case 
for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 176-77 (1997). 
 10. Wills, supra note 9, at 178-79. 
 11. Accord id. 
 12. Id. at 176-79. 
 13. The idea that battered women have an “image problem” in law is developed by Martha 
Mahoney in a seminal article on domestic violence.  See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of 
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 14. Hanna, supra note 7, at 1882-85; Mills, supra note 4, at 583 n.175. 
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of victimization from its co-existence with agency is a distorted understanding 
both of the particular problem of violence in individual women’s lives and its 
effects, as well as the broader social conditions in which this violence takes 
shape and gets perpetuated.  This, in turn, limits the efficacy of legal responses 
to and interventions in domestic violence. 
The two classes of victims I analyse in this paper, the essentially helpless 
one with the syndrome and the overly active agent who is “uncooperative,” are 
mirror-image and opposite examples of the difficulty incorporating 
acknowledgement of both victimization and agency in representations of 
women’s experiences of intimate violence.  The “battered woman syndrome” 
describes a woman’s utter helplessness in the face of ongoing abuse, e.g., her 
incapacity is such that she cannot plan for her own safety, and she cannot 
disentangle herself from her relationship with her abuser.15  She is a victim 
whose agency has been obliterated by the abuse.  The “uncooperative victim,” 
on the other hand, is seen to have an excessive expression of agency.16  By 
declining to participate or by not participating willingly and fully with the 
prosecution of domestic violence cases, these “uncooperative” women are seen 
to be non-compliant victims whose assertion of agency in opposition to the 
needs of the criminal justice system undercuts their victim status and the 
supportive response they warrant.17 
A critical examination of both of these categories of victims – those 
suffering from “battered woman syndrome” and those who are seen to be 
“uncooperative” or “reluctant” witnesses – sheds light on the larger 
complications which attach to legal images of assaulted women and the 
paradoxes and limitations of contemporary legal responses to domestic 
violence.  These limitations, in turn, necessarily impede the development of 
more adequate and nuanced accounts of the dynamics of domestic violence, 
accounts which are able to grasp simultaneously the contours of women’s 
victimization and the ways in which women negotiate, resist, and cope with 
this violence in the contexts of their lives. 
II.  THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MEN’S VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
A. Gender and Power 
As has been demonstrated by a now significant body of research on the 
topic, the majority of violence against women takes place in the context of 
intimate heterosexual relationships, and among its more brutal manifestations, 
 
 15. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 1. 
 16. See Mills, supra note 4, at 589; Hanna, supra note 7, at 1883. 
 17. See Hanna, supra note 7, at 1885. 
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includes repeated physical and sexual assaults.18  At the micro level, men’s 
violence against women in intimate relationships expresses the greater social 
power and control they wield; power which is also structured and entrenched at 
the macro-level of social relations, in terms of their overrepresentation in most 
positions of power and authority, including in the economic and political 
spheres. 
Gendered violence is a phenomenon that emerges from and reinforces 
women’s subordinate status in society.19  This has been recognized by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in cases including R. v. Seaboyer,20 Janzen v. Platy 
Enterprises,21 and R. v. Osolin.22  As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé remarked in 
Seaboyer, “perhaps more than any other crime, the fear and constant reality of 
sexual assault affects how women conduct their lives and how they define their 
relationship with the larger society.”23  In recent years there has been an 
increasing awareness of the prevalence of violence against women, including 
the specific problem of “woman abuse”24 in the context of spousal 
relationships.25  It has now become an accepted part of much of the 
 
 18. Lori Haskell & Melanie Randall, Appendix A: The Women’s Safety Project, in 
CANADIAN PANEL ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CHANGING THE LANDSCAPE: ENDING 
VIOLENCE – ACHIEVING EQUALITY app. A (1993); LORI HASKELL & MELANIE RANDALL, 
PRIVATE VIOLENCE/PUBLIC FEAR: RETHINKING WOMEN’S OWN SAFETY (Solicitor General of 
Canada ed., 1994); Melanie Randall & Lori Haskell, Sexual Violence in Women’s Lives: Findings 
from the Women’s Safety Project, A Community Based Survey, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 6, 
24 (1995) [hereinafter Randall & Haskell, Sexual Violence]; STATISTICS CANADA, THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (1993).  In the research analysed in these studies the 
perpetrators of the violence against women were overwhelmingly male. 
 19. Numerous research studies confirm the gender based nature of this violence.  For 
example, the Violence Against Women Survey conducted by Statistics Canada found that 39% of 
women reported at least one incident of sexual assault by a man since the age of 16.  Julian 
Roberts, Criminal Justice Processing of Sexual Assault Cases, 14 JURISTAT 7 (1994).  The 
Women’s Safety Project found that 54% of respondents reported an experience of sexual assault 
or attempted sexual assault at some point in their lives.  Randall & Haskell, Sexual Violence, 
supra note 18. 
 20. R v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. 
 21. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252. 
 22. R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595. 
 23. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 649 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting in part). 
 24. I use this term to refer to what is perhaps more commonly recognized under the label 
“wife assault.”  In order to acknowledge the fact that this kind of violence takes place in a variety 
of intimate heterosexual relationships, including marital and common law spousal relationships, 
as well as “dating” relationships I prefer the descriptor “woman” to that of “wife.”  In order to 
capture the broad range of intrusive, controlling, and violent behaviours manifested in intimate 
relationships I prefer the more expansive term “abuse” to that of “assault.” 
 25. Stark, supra note 1, at 977.  Some of the earliest key works on the topic were American 
and include: SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES 
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982); LENORE A. WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN (1979). 
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mainstream discourse on violence against women, for example, that “power 
and control” are central explanatory concepts in accounting for this violence.26 
Yet the concepts “power and control” can nevertheless run the risk of 
being understood in overly individualized terms if they are not linked to an 
analysis of the social relations of gender, specifically of the ways in which this 
violence expresses the imbalances of power embedded in those social relations 
of inequality.  By this I mean that it is possible to think that the men who 
perpetrate violence against women are deviant individuals with an unhealthy 
need for power and control, understood in terms of distortions in their personal 
psyches.  While attention to the factors which make some men act out violence 
towards women while others do not is of crucial importance, the larger point I 
am making here is that the problem of men’s violence against women is too 
pervasive to be understood as a pathology of a few individual men.  Instead, it 
must be analysed within the context of the larger patterns of presumed male 
entitlement, authority, and power constructed in the culture more broadly.  The 
rationalizations used by men who are “batterers” to explain, minimize, or 
excuse their assaults on their female partners are most telling in this regard for 
what they reveal about the larger constructs of traditional masculine norms.27  
Studying the micropolitics of power, as these are expressed in individual and 
intimate relationships between men and women, therefore, throws into stark 
relief the larger patterns of gendered social inequalities and the way in which 
these shape the conditions of women’s lives. 
The pervasive social problem of violence against women, including sexual 
assault, sexual harassment, and physical and sexual assault in intimate 
relationships, exists on an international scale28 and cannot be understood apart 
from the hierarchical and unequal relations of gender in which it is both 
situated and of which it is a product.  Put differently, violence against women 
simultaneously expresses and reproduces sexual inequality on both individual 
and societal levels; it is both a cause and effect of sex inequality. 
 
 26. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE (1989); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982); LIZ KELLY, SURVIVING 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (1988); SCHECTER, supra note 25; ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE 
INTRUSIONS: WOMEN’S EXPERIENCES OF MALE VIOLENCE (1985); Mahoney, supra note 13. 
 27. See generally R. EMERSON DOBASH ET AL., CHANGING VIOLENT MEN (2000); James 
Ptack, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133 
(Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988). 
 28. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: THE 
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF WOMEN 2 (2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/ 
eng-373; U.N. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY 3-4 (1989); CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, SPECIAL SESSIONS: WOMEN AND VIOLENCE, STATUS OF WOMEN CANADA,: BEIJING 
+5: FACTSHEETS (June 2002) at http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/b5_factsheets/ 
b5_factsheets_13_e.html. 
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B. The Prevalence and Characteristics of Abuse in Intimate Heterosexual 
Relationships 
Research has consistently demonstrated that approximately one in four 
women has experienced some kind of physical violence or physical assault in 
an intimate relationship with a male partner.29  As these studies document, 
violence against women in intimate relationships can take a variety of forms.30  
It can include kicks, slaps, shoving, use of weapons, death threats, repeated 
punching and beating, the infliction of burns, damage to the woman’s 
possessions, threats of harm against her, her friends, and her family, sexual 
assault, and a variety of other abusive behaviours.31  Far too often the 
specifically sexual violence, including rape, used by men against their female 
intimates, is an ignored component of violence against women in spousal 
relationships because it remains even more privatized and stigmatized than 
physical assaults.32 
Some women assaulted by their male intimates are subjected to prolonged 
and brutal beatings with great frequency; others have only been hit or assaulted 
a single time.33  Yet the effects of this kind of violence cannot be measured 
only in relation to variables like the frequency or severity of assault.  Instead, 
the way the violence operates as part of a larger pattern of coercion, control, 
and domination in the relationship must be taken into account, along, most 
importantly, with a woman’s subjective experience of this violence in order to 
appreciate for any individual woman what impact the violence has on her and 
the meaning she makes of it.34  As Lori Haskell has pointed out, a woman may 
only have been assaulted once in order to “learn” that she must thoroughly 
accommodate and adapt herself to the controlling tactics of her male partner to 
avoid further abuse.35 
 
 29. Randall & Haskell, Sexual Violence, supra note 18, at 24.  For example, the Women’s 
Safety Project reports that 27% of women interviewed disclosed physical assault by a male 
intimate.  Id.  Similarly, the original large scale Statistics Canada survey on women’s experiences 
of violence in adulthood, found that virtually the same proportion of women respondents, one in 
four (or 25%) reported at least one experience of physical assault perpetrated by a male intimate.  
STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 18. 
 30. See U.N. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, supra 
note 28, at 21. 
 31. See id. at 21-23. 
 32. See, e.g., DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF 
WIVES 84-87 (1985); RUSSELL, supra note 26, at 1-5. 
 33. See SCHECTER, supra note 25, at 222-23. 
 34. See U.N. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, supra 
note 28, at 21-22; Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home, in 
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 32 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994); SCHECHTER, supra note 25, at 222. 
 35. Lori Haskell, Remarks at Interviewer Training, Women’s Safety Project Research (1991) 
(remarks on file with author). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
114 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:107 
The idea of “intimate partner terrorism” as a way of conceptualizing 
violence against women in intimate relationships has gained prominence.36  
Other scholars have compared the unsettling effects of violence in intimate 
relationships with the kind of destabilization of entire communities which 
results from acts of political terrorism.  As Isabel Marcus sees it, 
[T]here are strong and striking parallels and similarities between terrorism as a 
strategy used to destabilize a community or society consisting of both women 
and men, and the abuse and violence perpetrated against women [by men] in 
intimate or partnering situations.37 
Marcus’s analogy draws the parallel between the disempowering and 
terrifying aspects and effects of political terrorism against specific 
communities and the sexual terrorism to which significant numbers of 
individual women are subjected in their intimate relationships with men.38  
This analogy, while powerful, should not eclipse attention to the fact that the 
compared contexts also differ in highly significant ways.  Whereas acts of 
political terrorism typically take place in a context of declared war or at least 
overt hostilities between (relatively) clearly defined and identified political 
groups, men’s acts of sexual violence against women in intimate relationships 
take place in contexts which are, to the contrary, supposed to be characterized 
by affective emotional ties, partnership, allegiance, trust, loyalty, and safety.39  
This, at least, is what is promised by the dominant discourses surrounding 
heterosexual marriage and “romantic love.”40  To this extent, acts of sexual and 
physical violence against women in their intimate relationships are striking 
 
 36. See, e.g., Michael Johnson, Patriarchical Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two 
Forms of Violence Against Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 283 (1995); Marcus, supra note 
34, at 30-32. 
 37. Marcus, supra note 34, at 32.  Marcus elaborates upon this analogy in the following 
terms: 
Like terror directed at a community, violence against women is designed to maintain 
domination and control, to enhance or reinforce advantages, and to defend privileges.  
Like other individuals or communities who experience politically motivated terrorism, 
women whose partnering and intimate relationships are marked by violence directed 
against them live in a world similarly punctuated by traumatic and/or catastrophic events, 
such as threats and humiliation, stalking and surveillance, coercion and physical violence.  
Within a family structure, women are likely to be the targets of violence, and men are 
likely to be the perpetrators.  Whether the violence is identified as the imposition of 
discipline, as a strategy of family governance, or as an act of masculinity, the 
consequences are the same.  Women learn that they can be kept in their culturally and 
socially designated “place” by the threat or imposition of physical injury. 
Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 12; Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression?  Women’s Lives, 
Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF 
DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra note 34, at 60. 
 40. See Mahoney, supra note 39, at 32; Marcus, supra note 34, at 32. 
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aberrations from what the norm is supposed to be and could be understood as a 
form of “undeclared” intimate warfare.41  This unnamed and isolating character 
of violence in intimate relationships makes the experience not only deeply 
traumatizing, but also deeply confusing for those women who find themselves 
in the position of trying to reconcile the violence perpetrated against them by 
the same person from whom they are supposed to receive love and, according 
to traditional gender scripts, “protection.”42 
III.  LEGAL IMAGES43 OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:  
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
REGARDING THE “BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME” 
A. Recognition of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” in Canadian Law: The 
Lavallée Decision44 
The reasonable man’s claims to universality are under siege.  The contest 
comes from those whose experiences are other than his.  The problem for them 
is how to effect a point of entry into the legal discourse of common sense and 
reasonableness.  That discourse, taken as belonging to everyone, is exclusive to 
those with power over knowledge.  So the problem is epistemological: how to 
alter ways of seeing, understanding and defining the normalcy of the 
reasonable man.45 
In Canada, it was R. v. Lavallée which provided a legal basis upon which 
to interject gender into the analysis of reasonableness brought to bear on 
criminal liability in cases of homicide perpetrated by “battered women.”46  
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Lavallée is famous for 
entrenching legal recognition of the evidentiary support provided through the 
“battered woman syndrome” to a woman’s self-defence claim in a criminal 
trial in which she stood accused of killing her violent male partner.47   
 
 41. Marcus, supra note 34, at 32. 
 42. Accord Mahoney, supra note 39, at 60; SCHECTER, supra note 25, at 222-24. 
 43. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 1-3 (using this descriptor to refer to the image of women, 
particularly battered women, created by the publicized courtroom trials in domestic violence 
cases). 
 44. R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. 
 45. Katherine O’Donovan, Law’s Knowledge: The Judge, the Expert, The Battered Woman, 
and Her Syndrome, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y. 427, 429 (1993). 
 46. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. 
 47. Id.  It is important to note that “battered woman syndrome” is not itself a defence to a 
criminal charge.  Instead, it is a psychological explanatory framework, introduced through expert 
evidence, through which a woman’s self defence claims can be evaluated in light of her previous 
experiences of violence.  Id. 
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The defence of self-defence has been often used in Canada in the relatively 
few cases of spousal homicide perpetrated by women.48  In Canadian law, as in 
most other jurisdictions, legal crime categories and defences differentiate 
between types of killings to distinguish those considered the most heinous, 
such as homicides which are “planned and deliberate” for example from those 
which take place under a range of other circumstances.49  In order to recognize 
the external exigencies and human “infirmities” which may contribute to or 
cause a killing, the law recognizes a number of defences to the crime of 
murder.50  If successful, a self-defence claim excuses the offender from legal 
liability for the killing.51  However, in cases of spousal homicide, this defence 
has not easily fit with dominant social perceptions of the kinds of 
circumstances in which this crime often takes place.52  As Mewett and 
Manning remark, “defences carry with them, by necessary implication, the 
problem of the social acceptability of the parameters of such defences.”53  In 
terms of the self-defence claims of women who kill their violent male partners, 
the traditional model of the sudden bar room brawl which erupts between two 
men who engage in physical combat that ends in the death of one of them, is 
neither an appropriate nor a relevant analogy. 
The Canadian Criminal Code contains several provisions relevant to the 
defence of self-defence.  Section 34(1) refers to killings in self-defence which 
were carried out unintentionally.54  The legal challenge in charges laid under 
this section lies in determining when an unintentional killing is justified and by 
what standard the determination is made, whether it be according to what the 
objective so-called “reasonable” person in the situation would assess or 
according to the subjective appraisal of the accused.55  In cases of spousal 
homicide where battered women who have endured prolonged victimization 
 
 48. Alison Young, Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis, 31 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 761, 781 (1993).  “[T]here has been no case in English criminal law where a 
battered woman has successfully pleaded that the homicide of her abuser was in her self-
defence.”  Id. 
 49. Martin’s Criminal Code, §§ 219-36; §§ 34-37 (2001) (Can.). 
 50. Martin’s Criminal Code, §§ 34-37 (2001) (Can.). 
 51. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 852; R. v. Kandola, [1993] 27 B.C.A.C. 226. 
 52. See Elizabeth Sheehy, Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 39 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 529, 532-34 (2001).  See also Brenda M. Baker, Provocation as a Defense 
for Abused Women Who Kill, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 193, 195 (1998). 
 53. MEWETT AND MANNING, CRIMINAL LAW 746 (3d ed. 1994). 
 54. The section reads: “Everyone who is unlawfully assaulted without having provoked the 
assault is justified in repelling force by force if the force he uses is not intended to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm and is no more than is necessary to defend himself.”  Martin’s Criminal 
Code, § 34(1) (2001) (Can.). 
 55. See generally R. v. Cinous, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973; David 
M. Paciocco, Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offenses and Defenses, 59 SASK L. 
REV. 271, 306-07 (1995). 
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kill their abusers, this question is of critical importance because the “ordinary” 
person’s perceptions of the actual incident or circumstances surrounding the 
killing may fail to grasp the context and the psychological effects of prolonged 
physical brutalization, the fear of further (often explicitly threatened) violence 
or death, and the perceived (and often very real) lack of options a battered 
woman may actually have in terms of protecting herself from her partner’s 
violence. 
Section 34(2) of the Criminal Code also deals with cases in which the 
accused killed in self-defence and specifies the extent of justification for this.56  
As Grant et al. point out, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. 
Lavallée, which was informed by the analysis offered in the expert testimony 
relating to “battered woman syndrome,” has particularly had far reaching 
implications for Section 34(2).57  The Lavallée decision has wide ranging legal 
repercussions for what it means to be “unlawfully assaulted,” the requirement 
that the accused exercised self-defence in response to an “imminent attack,” 
the common law “duty to retreat,” and the interpretation of “reasonableness” in 
cases of domestic violence. 
For example, at common law, the “assault” referred to in Section 34(2) 
from which the accused defends him or herself had been interpreted narrowly 
to exclude verbal threats to kill.58  However, this kind of narrow reading, 
which failed to grasp the nature of the often repeated threats made against a 
battered woman as part of the violence perpetrated against her, was overturned 
by Lavallée.59  In delivering the majority judgment for the Court, Justice 
Wilson clarified that “s. 34(2)(a) does not actually stipulate that the accused 
apprehend imminent danger when he or she acts” and further asserted that it is 
case law which has “read that requirement into the defence.”60  Justice Wilson 
 
 56. The section reads: 
Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous bodily harm in 
repelling the assault is justified if 
(a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from 
the violence with which the assault was originally made or with which the assailant 
pursues his purposes; and 
(b) he believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise preserve himself 
from death or grievous bodily harm. 
Martin’s Criminal Code, § 34(2) (2001) (Can.). 
 57. Martin’s Criminal Code, § 34(2) (2001) (Can.); R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852; 
Isabel Grants et al., A Forum on Lavallée v. R.: Women and Self Defense, 25 U.B.C. 23 (1991); 
Martha Shaffer, The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: Some Complicating Thoughts Years 
after R. v. Lavallée, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 1, 6 (1997). 
 58. See, e.g., Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 852; R. v. Reilly, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 396; R. v. 
Bogue, [1976] 70 D.L.R. 603; R. Whynot, [1983] 61 N.S.R. 33. 
 59. See generally Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 852. 
 60. Id. at 872-73. 
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criticized the narrow interpretation of assault in Whynot, in the following 
terms: 
The requirement imposed in Whynot that a battered woman wait until the 
physical assault is underway before her apprehension can be validated by law 
would, in the words of an American court, be tantamount to sentencing her to 
“murder by installment.”61 
This more expansive view of self-defence in Canadian jurisprudence is also 
evident in R. v. Whitten.62  In this decision, Chief Justice Glube referred to the 
evidence that the accused, a battered woman, was at the point she killed her 
husband “fending off an attack from him, albeit basically a verbal attack at the 
time, but which I have no doubt in the past led to physical attacks on upon 
her.”63 
In addition to excising the “imminent attack” requirement, the Lavallée 
judgment is significant for undermining the idea that the “duty to retreat” 
means that a battered woman who kills is deprived of the defence of self-
defence because she should have left her home.  The Court clarified that: 
[T]raditional self-defence doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her 
home instead of defending herself . . . .  A man’s home may be his castle but it 
is also the woman’s home even if it seems to her more like a prison in the 
circumstances.64 
Perhaps most significant in Lavallée, however, is the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s acceptance of the evidentiary support of battered woman syndrome 
in the self-defence claims made by the accused.65  This expert testimony was 
crucial in allowing for a new interpretation of “reasonableness” from the 
viewpoint of the battered woman who kills because she sees no other option 
and/or because she is protecting her own life.  As Justice Wilson elaborated: 
If it strains credulity to imagine what the “ordinary man” would do in the 
position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically find 
themselves in that situation.  Some women do, however.  The definition of 
what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, 
foreign to the world inhabited by the hypothetical “reasonable man.”66 
In this way, the Lavallée decision can be read as explicitly introducing gender 
into the “reasonable person” standard and as insisting upon a more contextual 
reading of what “reasonable” means from the particular life circumstances of 
the accused, when she is a woman who has been subjected to prolonged and 
ongoing violence and kills to save herself from this violence. 
 
 61. Id. at 853. 
 62. R. v. Whitten, [1992] 110 N.S.R.2d 149, at 157. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Accord Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 856-57. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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When women kill their spouses it is most often in the context of a 
relationship already characterized by extreme and/or repeated episodes of 
violence.  The killing usually takes place when the woman’s strategies of 
resistance and/or other avenues of escape have failed to protect her from 
further violence.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in Lavallée reflects 
a judicial decision significantly more sensitized to the social and individual 
circumstances in which some “battered women” kill to save their own lives 
and more sensitized to the desperation and fear which usually flow from living 
with ongoing violence and being threatened with death.  By removing the 
common law restrictions that had made self-defence virtually unavailable to 
battered women who kill, Lavallée offers a contextualized and gender sensitive 
reading of self-defence in relation to murder charges and an expanded legal 
understanding of the circumstances surrounding this particular form of spousal 
homicide.  To this extent, this decision represents a significant, if not 
unequivocal, step forward. 
B. The Battered Woman Syndrome and the “Cycle of Violence” 
Since its relatively recent acceptance in U.S. and Canadian case law, 
commentators from a variety of fields have expressed concern about the 
politically problematic aspects of the “battered woman syndrome.”67  Some 
have recommended ways of reconceptualizing this “syndrome” in order to 
avoid its most obvious limitations,68 while others have described it as a “red 
herring” and called for its elimination in the legal arena altogether.69  The 
trajectory of the “battered woman syndrome” and its reception in academic and 
legal circles cannot be traced without reference to the work of its originator, 
Lenore Walker, and her first articulation of the syndrome two decades ago.70 
 
 67. Shaffer, supra note 57, at 1. 
 68. See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: 
A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 1191, 1193 (1993); 
Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives 
on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1314 (1993); Shaffer, 
supra note 57, at 8-9; Stark, supra note 1, at 1009-11. 
 69. See, e.g., DONALD DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME 
SOCIETY AND THE LAW 223 (1996); Julianne Parfett, Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome 
Evidence: An Alternative Approach to the Use of Abuse Evidence in Spousal Homicide Cases, 12 
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOCIAL ISSUES 55, 96 (2001). 
 70. The identification and popularization of the category “battered woman” was most clearly 
and explicitly formulated in Walker’s widely cited and influential book, entitled The Battered 
Woman. See generally WALKER, supra note 25.  This text has been regarded as a classic in the 
field, along with her subsequent books and many articles.  See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, 
TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989) 
[hereinafter WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE]; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN’S 
SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN’S SYNDROME]. 
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Central to Walker’s explanatory account of the “battered woman 
syndrome” are the related concepts of “learned helplessness” and the “cycle of 
violence.”71  In Walker’s view, “learned helplessness” is a constitutive 
component of the “battered woman syndrome.”72 Walker’s original 
formulation of the “battered woman syndrome” drew on the work of Martin 
Seligman and a team of researchers who conducted research with animals to 
measure the behavioural effects of electric shocks administered to them while 
in captivity.73  Based on his laboratory studies of dogs, Seligman postulated the 
theory of “learned helplessness” to explain their response to abusive stimuli 
over which they could not exercise any control.74  As a result of the shocks, the 
dogs became listless, complacent, and passive and made no effort to escape 
their cages even when it was possible for them to do so.75  Walker saw this 
situation as parallel to that experienced by “battered women,” who, unable to 
 
  Walker provided one of the earliest feminist accounts of the experiences of women 
abused by their male intimate partners.  Her research on, and analyses of woman abuse, including 
her articulation of the “battered woman syndrome,” contain both elements of radicalism in their 
original conception, as well as the conservative and stereotypical elements which remain so 
troubling today.  For example, in her first book on the topic of woman battering, Walker outlines 
the various dimensions of this kind of abuse, including attention to women’s experiences of both 
physical and sexual assaults, economic deprivation, and social isolation imposed by their male 
partners.  In this way, Walker presents an expansive view of the features of violence against 
women in intimate relationships and identifies the ways in which violent men not only use 
physical assaults against the women with whom they live but also seek to exercise control over 
their female partners in a variety of other spheres.  Walker also explicitly identifies sexual 
subordination as the cause and context of domestic violence.  As she puts it, only where there is 
true equality between males and females can there be a society that is free from violence.  
WALKER, supra note 25, at x.  Writing over twenty years ago, Walker explicitly situated the 
problem of men’s violence against women in intimate relationships within the larger social 
relations of gender inequality. 
  In spite of these progressive and more contextualized aspects of her analysis, Walker 
nevertheless describes her research as aimed at studying “battered women’s problems” and as 
intended to illuminate the specific “psychology of battered women as victims.”  Id.  To this end, 
the explanatory model of the “battered woman’s syndrome” she developed to explore the special 
psychology of “battered women” has now become a dominant way of understanding the effects of 
this kind of violence in women’s lives.  In this way, then, Walker’s work ultimately ends up 
reinforcing a focus on the “psychology of victims” in ascribing to “battered women” a distinct 
psychological profile which seems ultimately to attach to the women themselves instead of being 
understood as a normal response to abnormal external circumstances.  Although it is arguably an 
inadvertent consequence of her research, Walker’s work – and the way it has been taken up since 
it first appeared – has significantly contributed to pathologizing and psychologizing of the lives of 
women who are assaulted by their male intimates. 
 71. See WALKER, supra note 25, at 42-70. 
 72. Id. at 47. 
 73. Id. at 45-46. 
 74. Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J. 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256, 258 (1968). 
 75. Id. at 256. 
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control or stop the violence perpetrated against them, “learned” to become 
“helpless” in the face of it.76  This concept is a foundational component of the 
“battered woman syndrome.”77 
The concept of “learned helplessness” is one of the fundamental flaws 
which construct the problems associated with the “battered woman syndrome.”  
The focus on a battered woman’s so-called “helplessness,” whether learned or 
not, not only over generalizes by stereotyping the experiences of women who 
experience violence in their intimate relationships, but it also reveals a deeper 
problem.  Most fundamentally, it focuses the lens on the individual woman’s 
perceived inability to react more effectively to her difficult circumstances and 
loses sight of two typically co-existing, more significant and determinative 
phenomena (as I elaborate more fully below).  These are, first and foremost, 
the fact that most battered women are not helpless but are, in fact, actively 
engaged in a pursuing a variety of coping, help-seeking, and resistance 
strategies.78  Second, the “learned helplessness” model entirely overlooks the 
myriad ways in which the social conditions of inequality so often limit or 
thwart battered women’s help-seeking strategies. 
According to Walker, there is also a “cycle of violence” which 
characterizes violence against women in their intimate relationships with 
men.79  This cycle comprises three distinct phases: the tension building phase 
prior to an assault, the eruption of violence, and the period of contrition which 
typically follows, sometimes referred to as the “honeymoon” period.80  Yet the 
notion that violence in intimate relationships follows such a discernible pattern 
is a rather formulaic, and even static representation.  Despite the fact that it is 
predicated on a view of the cyclical nature of violence, it overemphasizes the 
“violent event” itself, by defining all of the phases of the cycle in relation to 
the “violent episode.”81  In this way, the dynamic and ongoing ways in which 
violent and abusive men exercise control, domination, and coercion over their 
female partners are obscured in favour of overplaying the significance of the 
actual and discrete “incidents” of physical assault.82  But for a woman living 
with a violent male partner, there may never be a period she experiences as a 
“honeymoon” phase, as the absence of physical assault does not eradicate its 
ongoing consequences, including the woman’s need for hypervigilance in 
 
 76. See WALKER, supra note 25, at 48. 
 77. Id. at 47. 
 78. See, e.g., EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988). 
 79. Id. at 55. 
 80. Id. at 56-70. 
 81. Id. at 59-69. 
 82. This is in no way to suggest that physical assaults are not highly significant and 
destructive events; rather, that physical violence is typically only one expression of a larger and 
often more insidious pattern of domination and control. 
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guarding against/watching for “the next time” and the ways in which the 
domination is sedimented through multiple layers of everyday behaviours and 
areas through which his control is assumed and exerted.83  In this way, the very 
notion of a “cycle of violence” strips away the complex, ongoing, and 
relational dimensions of the patterns of male control and domination of which 
the man’s violence is only a part. 
Evan Stark makes a similar point when he observes that: 
[W]ork with battered women . . . suggests that physical violence may not be 
the most significant factor about most battering relationships.  In all 
probability, the clinical profile revealed by battered women reflects the fact 
that they have been subjected to an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation 
and control that extends to all areas of a woman’s life, including sexuality; 
material necessities; relations with family, children, and friends; and work.84 
Findings from the Women’s Safety Project research confirm precisely this 
point, that in women’s own subjective experience an episode of violence 
perpetrated by their male intimate partner can impose severe limitations on 
diverse areas of their lives.85 
The more generalized patterns of control and subordination which 
underpin intimate violence, therefore, can be seen in the many areas in which 
assaulted women report feeling deeply constrained, limited, and restricted in 
their everyday lives.86  To this extent, the “cycle of violence” postulated by 
Walker misses the ongoing relational aspects of women’s subordination in 
their relationships with violent male partners, as well as the patterns of 
domination and subordination which do not evaporate in any so-called 
“honeymoon phase” and which extend beyond the immediate consequences of 
men’s discrete acts of violence to powerfully restrain women’s freedom and 
autonomy. 
 
 83. See WALKER, supra note 25, at 48. 
 84. Stark, supra note 1, at 986. 
 85. For example, a majority of the women interviewed for that study who disclosed an 
experience of physical assault in an intimate relationship with a man reported that as a result of 
the violence they felt unable to express any criticisms of their partners, ask for his participation in 
child care responsibilities, or have control over their own money.  More specifically, in 53% of 
the cases in which women reported physical assault in an intimate relationship they also reported 
that they felt unable to disagree with their partner.  In 42% of these cases women reported being 
unable to spend time apart from their male partners, and 25% reported that they could not wear 
the clothes they wanted to.  Perhaps most telling and most disturbing is that in 40% of cases of 
physical assault in intimate relationships the women interviewed reported that they did not feel 
able to refuse unwanted sex, suggesting that they may have often accommodated unwanted sex 
with their abusive partners in order to avoid further conflict and/or physical assault.  See Lori 
Haskell & Melanie Randall, Politics of Women’s Safety: Sexual Violence, Women’s Fear and the 
Public/Private Split, 26 RESOURCES FEMINIST RES. 113, 141-42 (1999). 
 86. Id. at 142. 
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C. Dysfunction, Deficits, and Other Pathologies: The Battered Woman and 
Her “Syndrome”87 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the “battered woman syndrome” is the 
way it calls up and underlines the popular image of a woman who has been 
subjected to violence as a helpless and utter “victim” and as one who has been 
rendered totally passive and ineffective as a result of this violence.  This image 
of the “battered women” has now been firmly inscribed in legal discourse 
surrounding “battered women” who kill, given the way in which expert 
evidence on the syndrome presented at trial is so often given and/or received.88  
Martha Shaffer’s review of Canadian case law since Lavallée, in which 
battered woman syndrome has supported a self-defence claim for a woman 
accused of killing her violent spouse, indicates that the image of the helpless 
battered woman is potentially tied to the even more dangerous stereotype of 
the “authentic” and “deserving” battered woman.89  Those “battered women” 
who fail to conform to this stereotype of incapacity, because they are seen as 
angry, aggressive, or “tough,” may fail to have a jury or judge understand the 
applicability of the doctrine of self-defence and the Lavallée expansion of 
“reasonableness” to their defence claims.90 
This tendency towards stereotyping of women’s experiences that inheres in 
the syndrome has been soundly criticized by a variety of scholars.  For 
example, in Evan Stark’s view, the “battered woman syndrome” provides an 
“inaccurate, reductionist and potentially demeaning representation of woman 
battering”91 insofar as it “emphasizes the disabling effects of violence rather 
than women’s survival skills.”92  For Mary Dutton, a clinical psychologist, one 
of the major shortcomings of “battered woman syndrome” is that it is taken to 
represent the psychology of all battered women when, in her view, “battered 
women’s diverse psychological realities are not limited to one particular 
‘profile’.”93  Further, according to Martha Shaffer, the “battered woman 
syndrome” represents battered women as “dysfunctional” and therefore as 
incapable of autonomy or rationality in their actions.94 
These critiques are well founded for the emphasis on the psychological 
incapacitation of “battered women” is not accidental but is absolutely central to 
the definition of the syndrome itself.  Walker, in fact, is explicit in expressing 
her view that battering produces the state of “learned helplessness” in women 
 
 87. See O’Donovan, supra note 45, at 427. 
 88. See generally Shaffer, supra note 57; see also Mahoney, supra note 13, at 24-33. 
 89. Shaffer, supra note 57, at 25. 
 90. Id. at 30-32. 
 91. Stark, supra note 1, at 975. 
 92. Id. at 1000. 
 93. Dutton, supra note 68, at 1195. 
 94. Shaffer, supra note 57, at 19. 
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and that the psychological effects of battering result in a form of psychological 
impairment, a diminished capacity in terms of the woman’s emotions, 
cognitions, and behaviour.95  As she explains in her book Terrifying Love: Why 
Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds, “the process of learned 
helplessness results in a state with deficits in three specific areas: in the area 
where battered women think, in how they feel, and in the way they behave.”96  
There is no subtlety or ambiguity in this formulation.  Walker is explicit that 
the psychological consequences of battering are such that the woman becomes 
psychically “damaged” and, by obvious inference, cannot make the kinds of 
decisions she would or should make if she were not suffering from the 
“syndrome.”97  To this extent, then, the “battered woman syndrome” is 
arguably little more than a more compassionate and gender sensitive version of 
the traditional psychiatric view of women as “irrational” or even “insane,”98 
except that this version incorporates a recognition that the women’s alleged 
“irrationality” or psychological incapacity results from the infliction of abuse 
upon her by a male intimate.  In other words, the abuse is seen to be wrong and 
not the woman’s fault in the “battered woman syndrome,” but it is also seen to 
have made her lack autonomy and rationality. 
D. Making Women’s Resistance Visible 
Both of the formulations – “learned helplessness” and “battered women’s 
syndrome” – emphasize passivity and powerlessness at the expense of 
recognizing women’s struggles and resilience in the face of the conditions of 
their subordination, of which the violence forms only a part.  Moreover, they 
entirely obliterate the varied and complex strategies of resistance that most 
women who experience violence actually devise and carry out.99 
Research with women assaulted by their male partners has consistently 
demonstrated that women employ a range of creative ways through which they 
attempt to escape, avoid, minimize, or stop the violence against them.100  In the 
Women’s Safety Project study, for example, the majority of the 420 women 
 
 95. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 70, at 50-51. 
 96. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 97. See generally id. at 42-53. 
 98. See ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 158-66, 288-89 (1980) (presenting an analysis of 
the courts’ historical predilection for accepting pleas of insanity in cases of women who killed 
their violent male spouses over explanations which address the dynamics of the violence and the 
woman’s lack of options). 
 99. See Melanie Randall, Agency and (In)Subordination: Victimization, Resistance and 
Sexual Violence in Women’s Lives (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, York University) (on 
file with author) (analysing women’s resistance strategies in the context of violence). 
 100. See, e.g., MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A 
MODEL FOR ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 41-43 (1992); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 78, 
at 28. 
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randomly surveyed reported using a variety of resistance strategies in relation 
to experiences of sexual violence.101  Specifically, in 64% of the (134) cases of 
physical assault perpetrated by a male intimate, women expressed some form 
of resistance, as they did in 70.6% of the cases of sexual assault.102  Even in 
terms of responding to experiences of sexual abuse and incest in childhood, in 
68.8% of these (339) cases women reported that they mounted some kind of 
resistance.103 
The problem is that the social conditions of inequality often impose severe 
limitations on the options which are actually available to women, including a 
lack of second stage housing, sex segregation and unequal pay in the labour 
market, a lack of available and affordable child care facilities, the social, 
ideological, and economic pressures to “keep the family together,” and the 
stigmatizing and victim-blaming attitudes which still prevail and which often 
hold women accountable for the violence perpetrated against them.104  For 
women from racialized groups, immigrant, or refugee women, these conditions 
are often exacerbated by the relations of racism and the fact that membership 
in a racial “minority” group and lower socio-economic status are often co-
terminus.105  These conditions of inequality, therefore, seriously constrain the 
extent to which women can exercise “choice” and autonomy and the extent to 
which they are able to resist the violence perpetrated against them.  Yet in spite 
of these conditions, what is remarkable is that so many women still find 
creative and effective ways to resist violence and abuse. 
In legal terms, instead of widening the lens through which women’s 
experiences of violence are understood, the “battered woman syndrome” may 
ultimately replace one set of narrow stereotypes for another.  This is because 
the use of “battered woman syndrome” as evidentiary support for a self-
defence claim made by a woman who has killed her violent spouse “furthers a 
trend away from justification defenses for women defendants” by resting on an 
account of psychological incapacity. 106  It does this by answering the “why 
didn’t she leave?” question with a psychological account of the battered 
woman’s helplessness which results from her exposure to prolonged violence.  
As Donald Downs observes, “battered woman syndrome speaks the language 
of justification and situational excuse, [but] is at heart a defense based on 
 
 101. See Randall, supra note 99, at 148 (discussing these results). 
 102. Id.  These figures exclude cases of sexual assault which also took place in the context of 
a relationship where the woman was also physically battered as these were included in the data 
set which documents physical assault in intimate relationships.  These figures also refer only to 
the more “extreme” and narrowly defined cases of sexual violence, documented on the mini-
questionnaires.  Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Dutton, supra note 68, at 1232-40; WALKER, supra note 25, at 14-15. 
 105. Accord Dutton, supra note 68, at 1236-38. 
 106. DOWNS, supra note 69, at 226. 
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incapacity excuses.”107  In this way the image of the helpless, passive, and 
debilitated “battered woman” plays into pre-existing social and legal 
stereotypes about women’s diminished capacities. 
E. Misapplications of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” in Law 
Battered woman syndrome is, among other things, a tool by which legal 
authorities, including juries, can bend or tailor stringent legal rules to achieve 
justice in individual cases.108 
The battered woman syndrome was a watershed in social and legal 
understandings of domestic violence.109 
The acceptance of the “battered woman syndrome” by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Lavallée and its use in the Canadian legal system since that 
decision have not amounted to an unambiguous or unequivocal advance in the 
law’s response in Canada to the problem of violence against women in 
intimate relationships generally or in supporting the defence of self-defence for 
women accused of killing their violent male partners specifically.110  Even 
aside from its inherent limitations, in terms of achieving relief for individual 
women who have experienced extreme violence and killed in self-defence, the 
evidentiary support provided by the battered woman syndrome has made little 
difference. 
In 1995, the Minister of Justice and the Solicitor General of Canada 
established a Self-Defence Review, headed by Judge Lynn Ratushny, to re-
examine convictions of women in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
finding in Lavallée.111  The Review’s final report, released in 1997, 
recommended some kind of relief for only seven of the ninety-eight cases 
considered and did not result in the release of a single woman from jail, an 
outcome one commentator has described as “disturbing.”112 
Critically reviewing this review, Elizabeth Sheehy remarks that “feminist 
activists and lawyers will have to work to generate systematic changes out of 
the [Self-Defence Review].”113  Additionally, based on a separate empirical 
analysis of the impact of Lavallée in the five years following the judgment, 
 
 107. Id.  Downs is actually somewhat inaccurate in his language here because “battered 
woman syndrome” is not itself a defence but simply lends support to a defence of self-defence 
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 109. Meier, supra note 68, at 1305. 
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Martha Shaffer argues that the decision “does not appear to have led to a 
dramatic increase in successful self-defence claims by women.”114  Ironically, 
then, the “battered woman syndrome” has not had an especially major impact 
in case law, in Canada at least, certainly not in proportion to the ink which has 
been spilled in analysing its legal significance.115 
The battered woman syndrome, however, has appeared in some legal cases 
in Canada and elsewhere in surprising and potentially quite troubling ways.  
For example, in the United States, Dr. Lenore Walker, who, because of her 
research and writing in the field is considered to be a leading expert on the 
condition, was scheduled and publicly announced as an expert witness for the 
defence in the trial of O.J. Simpson.116  Her testimony was solicited by the 
defence in order to bolster the claim that the accused’s history of battering his 
wife did not predict that he was a murderer.117  Whether or not this is true is 
less relevant than the fact that a psychological construct developed to describe 
the experiences and psychological profile of women subjected to ongoing 
violence from their husbands was now being used as a predictor for whether or 
not men were likely to kill the women they assaulted.118  Not only is the 
“battered woman syndrome” based on research with women, and therefore of 
no utility in explaining the behaviour of abusive men (who would need to be 
studied directly in order to develop a similar profile, such as a “male batterer’s 
syndrome”), but its attempted utilization as evidence in a defence for a man 
accused of killing his wife represents a highly distorted and dangerous 
misapplication.119 
In Canada in the infamous legal proceedings around the legal culpability of 
Karla Homolka for the sexual torture and killings of young women (including 
her own younger sister) which she alleged were perpetrated exclusively by her 
husband Paul Bernardo, the “battered woman syndrome” was invoked in her 
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based on a defendant’s reasonable belief that there was no alternative course of action available, 
so that it was necessary for him to kill to protect himself from death or grievous bodily harm.  
While the case did involve a question of whether Lavallée created a right to “preemptive 
killings,” the Court concluded that the defence was intended to cover situations of last resort.  R. 
v. Cinous, [2000], 2 S.C.R. 3. 
 116. Melanie Frager Griffith, Note, Battered Women Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64 
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defence.120  While the violence perpetrated by Bernardo against Homolka may 
be relevant to a complete account of the situation, whether or not it could 
possibly exonerate Homolka’s responsibility for at best not intervening to stop 
and at worst actively participating in these sexual crimes and murders is 
another question altogether.  In her article on this topic, Melanie Griffith cites 
numerous other examples of this misapplication and warns that courts must 
strive to assess relevance and thereby avoid various misuses of “battered 
woman syndrome.”121  There are also disturbing reports of the “battered 
woman syndrome” being used to discredit women’s parenting abilities in cases 
of custody disputes where there is a history of domestic violence.122  While 
these misapplications of the “battered woman syndrome” do not necessarily 
inhere in the description of the syndrome itself, they do, nevertheless, point to 
troubling ways in which it can be engaged legally. 
However, in spite of these more problematic applications of the “battered 
woman syndrome” there have also been some encouraging legal developments 
in how it has been understood.  In R. v. Mallot, some members of the Supreme 
Court of Canada recognized many of the fundamental dilemmas involved in 
the use of the battered woman syndrome, in the separate opinion written by 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, for herself and Justice McLachlin (as she was 
then).123  In this opinion, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé articulated a sophisticated 
feminist analysis which engaged the contemporary academic commentary on 
the hazards which can accompany the use of the battered woman syndrome 
and takes judicial note of some of the concerns raised therein.124 
The case was not especially significant in terms of any new legal 
developments relating to the battered woman syndrome and the defence of 
self-defence, as it essentially involved an appeal dismissed unanimously by the 
Supreme Court, surrounding whether or not the trial judge’s charge to the jury 
supported a conviction for second degree murder for a woman charged with 
killing her former common law spouse.125  The facts of the case were relatively 
straightforward, and the Court found that the trial judge adequately dealt with 
the evidence relating to battered woman syndrome in relation to the accused’s 
self-defence claim.126  What is interesting about the judgment, however, is 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s expanded articulation of the legal significance of 
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“battered woman syndrome” and the ways in which it should inform the legal 
inquiry into a woman’s self-defence claim in a criminal proceeding.127 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé explained, for example, that it was accepted in 
Lavallée that “a woman’s perception of what is reasonable is influenced by her 
gender, as well as by her individual experience.”128  This must be the basis 
from which a self-defence claim is evaluated.  Otherwise, Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé cautions, “it is possible that those women who are unable to fit 
themselves within the stereotype of a victimized, passive, helpless, dependent, 
battered woman will not have their claims to self-defence fairly decided.”129  
Accepting that the “battered woman syndrome” can tend to reinforce a 
stereotypical view of the woman who has experienced violence as passive and 
helpless, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé emphasizes the “other elements of a 
woman’s social context which help to explain her inability to leave her 
abuser,” including a lack of economic resources, fear of retaliation, 
responsibility for children, as well as inadequate social support.130  Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé went on to stress that these very factors must “necessarily 
inform the reasonableness of a woman’s beliefs or perceptions of, for instance, 
her lack of an alternative to the use of deadly force to preserve herself from 
death or grievous bodily harm.”131 
Finally, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé advised courts on how they can give 
practical effect to the principles articulated in the Lavallée decision.  In her 
words: 
To fully accord with the spirit of Lavallée, where the reasonableness of a 
battered woman’s belief is at issue in a criminal case, a judge and jury should 
be made to appreciate that a battered woman’s experiences are both 
individualized, based on her own history and relationships, as well as shared 
with other women, within the context of a social and legal system which has 
historically undervalued women’s experiences.  A judge and jury should be 
told that a battered women’s experiences are generally outside the common 
understanding of the average judge and juror, and that they should seek to 
understand the evidence being presented to them in order to overcome the 
myths and stereotypes which we all share.  Finally, all of this should be 
presented in such a way as to focus on the reasonableness of the woman’s 
actions, without relying on old or new stereotypes about battered women.132 
In this judicial pronouncement Justice L’Heureux-Dubé demonstrated an 
acute sensitivity and nuanced appreciation of the need for legal recognition of 
both specificity and generality, the level of the individual and the social, in 
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assessing the self-defence claims of battered women who kill.  Moreover, she 
exhorted those in the legal arena to acknowledge a general lack of awareness 
of the particularities of the experiences of women assaulted by their male 
intimates and to struggle against their own stereotypes.133  While the effect of 
this kind of legal analysis coming from at least two members of the Supreme 
Court of Canada has yet to be seen, its very articulation is an encouraging and 
necessary development in correcting some of the stereotypical excesses of the 
syndrome.  Yet it is not enough to signal that the battered woman syndrome 
should be retained in support of the self-defence claims of battered women 
who kill.  The problems with the syndrome are too daunting, and its defects too 
entrenched.  Moreover, there are more sophisticated methods for ensuring that 
the evidentiary record educates courts about the effects, impacts, and contexts 
of intimate violence in women’s lives. 
F. The “Battered Woman Syndrome”: Can It Be Rehabilitated? 
Given judicial notice in Canada of the problems with the “battered woman 
syndrome”134 and given a considerable literature analysing and critiquing the 
syndrome,135 can the concept be salvaged and still be of some utility in legal 
contexts in which domestic violence comes into play?  There have been many 
critiques of the syndrome, and some attempts at reformulating it in a way that 
attempts to avoid its worst difficulties in legal contexts.136 
Mary Dutton, for example, suggests an expanded version of “battered 
woman syndrome” which can be presented in evidence in legal contexts.137  In 
her view a redefined “battered woman syndrome” can assist in supporting the 
self-defence claims of assaulted women who kill their abusers, through the 
provision of carefully crafted expert testimony which addresses factors beyond 
the psychological reactions to violence and which acknowledges that these 
psychological reactions do not fit neatly into one singular profile.138  
Specifically, Dutton advocates a “redefined” version of battered woman 
syndrome which comprises four elements: first, an account of the history and 
nature of the violence experienced by the woman; second, an exposition of the 
particular battered woman’s psychological reactions to the violence she has 
experienced; third, an explication of the strategies she used (or did not use) to 
escape her abuser prior to killing him; and fourth, an elucidation of the 
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intervening and contextual factors which influenced the woman’s 
psychological response and coping strategies in relation to the violence.139 
Dutton’s expanded version of the “battered woman syndrome” is a definite 
improvement over the original version espoused by Walker.  By including 
attention to issues of social context through expert testimony provided to the 
Court, by highlighting women’s resistance strategies, and by attending to 
differences in the experiences, psychologies, and material resources of women 
assaulted by their male intimates, Dutton’s reformulation addresses and 
corrects many of the problems which accompany the “battered woman 
syndrome” in its original version.  In particular, it more fully contextualizes the 
particular woman’s experience and attempts to overcome the tendencies 
towards stereotyping which the original “battered woman syndrome” typically 
entails. 
Following Dutton’s recommendations, expert testimony on “battered 
woman syndrome” would be greatly improved, and an expanded view of the 
problem of violence against women in intimate relationships would be 
provided in legal proceedings dealing with it.  However, Dutton’s redefined 
version of the “syndrome” still accepts the language of syndromization, which 
suggests psychological disorder instead of social problem.  Additionally, her 
redefinition is, although expanded, still an essentially psychologically focused 
account of women’s reactions to violence with an emphasis on the individual 
psyches of women who have been battered by their male intimates.  In this way 
it does not entirely avoid the pitfalls of the “battered woman syndrome” in its 
traditional version.  Nor does it escape evoking the victim-blaming reactions 
which many judges or juries may have when they focus on and individual 
woman’s reactions to violence and fail to understand her psyche or her actions 
as “reasonable.” 
Furthermore, Dutton’s emphasis on strategies a “battered woman” has used 
with regard to the violence she has experienced can still lead to a 
reinforcement of the idea that it is a woman’s responsibility to stop the 
violence perpetrated against her.  This is not so much a reflection on any defect 
in Dutton’s approach as it is a comment on the larger dilemmas surrounding 
discussions of women’s resistance strategies in a society pervaded by victim 
blaming attitudes.  Implicitly, then, a kind of victim-blaming could potentially 
seep into the legal inquiry if the focus becomes one of evaluating the number 
and efficacy of the resistance/avoidance strategies any “battered woman” has 
used.  Instead, the inquiry must remain firmly focused on the systematic social 
failure to provide adequate resources and multiple options for women who are 
experiencing abuse to leave violent men and reconstruct their lives so that their 
safety is ensured, while recognizing any efforts a woman was able to make 
within these constraints. 
 
 139. Id. at 1202. 
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Dutton’s proposed redefinition of the “battered woman syndrome” in legal 
contexts is a dramatically more sophisticated and contextualized approach to 
its traditional use and addresses many of the syndrome’s fundamental flaws.  
In more recent writing, Dutton appears to have strengthened her critique of the 
“battered woman syndrome,” though she continues to “suggest the need for a 
reformulation of this model”140 instead of an outright rejection of it.  I would 
argue, however, that the very flaws she identifies are such that any 
rehabilitative efforts ought to be abandoned in favour of the adoption of 
entirely new approaches, ones which expressly refuse to make reference to the 
“battered woman syndrome” at all.  Instead of relying upon a formulation 
which mandates inclusions of certain “pathologies” and decontextualizes 
critical aspects of the experience of being assaulted to the detriment of 
grasping this experience in all of its complexity, expert evidence should be 
marshaled to educate judges and juries about the social causes, contexts, and 
impacts of intimate violence without reliance on the “battered woman 
syndrome.” 
G. Why the Battered Woman Syndrome Should Be Abandoned: Alternative 
Evidentiary Approaches 
Among the most problematic elements of the so-called “battered woman 
syndrome” is the construct of “learned helplessness” which rests at the core of 
the syndrome.141  In this view, the battered woman has learned to become 
helpless through her prolonged exposure to violence at the hands of her 
husband and is, in fact, characterized as mentally disordered as a result of the 
abuse she has suffered.142  But in psychologizing and individualizing the issue 
in these terms, the focus is deflected away from recognition of first, the social 
conditions which often keep women trapped in relationships with violent men 
(including indifferent or inadequate police response, financial dependence, 
child care responsibilities, poverty, and the husband’s threat to kill her and her 
children if she leaves, etc.); and second, the many ways in which women who 
are battered do actively struggle to survive, resist, and fight back against the 
violence they experience (hardly consistent with the traditional image of the 
passive, helpless victim which inheres in the battered woman syndrome).143 
Most fundamentally, the “battered woman syndrome,” both in its original 
conception and in the way it has been taken up in law, reflects a preoccupation 
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with victimization at the expense of any recognition of agency.144  This is part 
of a larger social tendency to understand victimization and agency in 
dichotomous terms, as existing as binary opposites.  Glaringly absent from 
most representations of violence in intimate heterosexual relationships, then, is 
attention to the many and complicated ways in which the violence is contested 
and resisted by assaulted women.  Instead, the focus is typically on the ways in 
which battered women are rendered helpless victims.145 
Equally absent is any acknowledgment of the larger failings of the very 
systems and institutions that are supposed to protect against and provide 
remedies for this violence, failings that undercut women’s resistance strategies.  
More importantly still, the larger context of social inequality which produces 
this violence in women’s lives in the first place is typically dropped out of 
view.  This results in most dominant representations, including legal 
representations of the lives of women who experience ongoing violence and 
abuse from men,146 failing to incorporate a view of women’s lives which 
reflects both the structures of inequality which shape these lives and the 
possibilities and expressions of agency within these structures. 
It is this broader and skewed depiction of violence against women which 
underpins the “battered woman syndrome” and its use in legal contexts.  This 
reason, among others, means that the doctrine must ultimately be abandoned in 
favour of more contextualized and sophisticated psycho-social accounts which 
can be offered up by qualified experts giving evidence to courts, who grasp 
both the macro and micro levels of assaulted women’s experiences. 
If the “battered woman syndrome” should be abandoned because it is 
conceptually inadequate for the task of educating courts about the causes, 
contexts, and impacts of domestic violence in women’s lives, what is a 
preferred approach?  One Canadian commentator has suggested that critical 
attention should be paid to more skillful utilization of the already existing 
defences in criminal law that might assist those battered women who kill in 
self-defence.147  Arguing for better use of the structures of the defences 
“already in place” to bring forth evidence of domestic violence when women 
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kill their violent male intimate, Julianne Parfett makes the case that, in addition 
to self-defence, provocation (to diminish culpability), and in some cases 
insanity, may support the claims of battered women who kill.148  But in spite of 
her effective critique of the “battered woman syndrome,” Parfett’s 
recommendations remain, by her own admission, “individualistic.”149  While 
attention to the individual circumstances of any criminal defendant is essential, 
the set of recommendations Parfett proposes fails to engage with and advance 
an analysis of domestic violence and its impact that grasps its social contexts 
and consequences, as these are lived at the level of individual women’s lives. 
Moreover, Parfett’s recommended reforms would, in fact, aggravate the legal 
situation given the problematic nature of these defences, particularly 
provocation. 
On a different strategic and evidentiary track, one that expressly engages 
social conditions, Evan Stark recommends the substitution of what he calls the 
“coercive control framework” for the current uses of the “battered woman 
syndrome” in legal contexts.150  For Stark, this alternative framework more 
fully captures the “hostage like” conditions of entrapment and subordination in 
which many “battered women” live.151  Moreover, this framework, which 
“emphasizes the batterer’s pattern of coercion and control rather than the 
violent acts of their effect on victim psychology”152 shifts the focus to: 
[T]he basis of women’s justice claims from stigmatizing psychological 
assessments of traumatization to the links between structural inequality, the 
systemic nature of women’s oppression in particular relationship, and the 
harms associated with domination and resistance as it has been lived.153 
Through this “coercive control framework,” Stark claims that expert evidence 
can discourage stereotyping of “battered woman syndrome” and accommodate 
women’s differences including not only their differing reactions to violence 
(which may include anger instead of passivity) but also their differences in 
social location, including along lines of class and race.154 
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One concern is that Stark’s “coercive control model” may be taken up and 
dismissed in legal contexts as mere “advocacy,” a point raised by Joan 
Meier.155  To the extent that courts seem to prefer expert testimony which can 
be characterized as “scientific,” Stark’s explicitly political model may carry 
less weight than more “scientific” psychological theories and accounts.156  
Still, this is a strategic issue to be worked out in the context of specific legal 
cases.  At any rate Stark’s vision of the kind of expert testimony to be offered 
in support of battered women’s self-defence claims has the definite advantage 
of deflecting attention away from the “why did she stay” question and focusing 
more on providing a contextual analysis of violence against women in intimate 
relationships and its links to the very real and material conditions of sexual 
inequality in which it is situated and lived. 
In addition to expert evidence to educate juries and the judiciary about 
these material conditions and the way in which they shape and constrain 
women’s choices, a rich psychological literature is emerging, which, when 
integrated with a gender analysis goes a long way towards explaining the 
traumatic effects of intimate violence in women’s lives.157  Some of the ground 
breaking work in this area was undertaken by Judith Herman, whose book 
Trauma and Recovery began to develop an articulation of the intersections 
between the effects of privatized traumatic events in women’s lives such as 
domestic violence and sexual assault and the way in which this trauma 
parallels some of the experiences of public, political terrorism.158  Developing 
some of the themes in this area and expressly incorporating a gender analysis 
into the psychological trauma literature, some feminist psychologists are 
developing accounts of the ways in which post-traumatic stress is the normal 
response to abnormal events such as violence and abuse in an intimate 
relationship.159 Contextualized evidence about post-traumatic stress 
“disorder”160 is more appropriate insofar as “it shifts the focus away from the 
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‘personality’ or ‘character’ of the battered woman, and describes her 
behaviours as a natural human response to trauma imposed from external 
sources.”161 
Expert evidence presented by qualified mental health professionals whose 
understanding of post-traumatic stress (a recognized diagnostic category in the 
fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(“DSM-IV”)) expressly incorporates a recognition of gender (and other social) 
inequalities can be of significant assistance to legal proceedings relating to 
domestic violence.162  Specifically, this kind of evidentiary record can enable 
legal factfinders to situate their knowledge of an individual assaulted woman 
within an analysis of the social contexts and dynamics of domestic violence 
generally and how these are relevant to the particular legal issues at play.  
These richer, socio-psychological accounts offer the opportunity to assist 
courts in coming to terms with and developing more sophisticated 
understandings of the conditions of the lives of assaulted women and the 
circumstances in which they make their individual choices and decisions. 
IV.  UNCOOPERATIVE VICTIMS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A. Blaming Battered Women for Refusing to Cooperate with Criminal 
Prosecutions 
It is well documented that many women who have experienced ongoing 
violence against them in their intimate relationships are reluctant to assist with 
the criminal prosecution of their partners.163  In these situations, women do not 
cooperate with the Crown attorney or prosecutor in charge of the case in a 
variety of ways.  Most often it is by failing to appear in criminal proceedings 
relating to the episodes of domestic violence they experienced or by recanting 
once on the witness stand.164  The reasons for women’s ambivalence about 
these criminal proceedings are varied and complex and range from (but are not 
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limited to) a belief that the criminal justice system will not meet their needs, 
fear of retaliation from the abuser, a commitment to reconciliation with the 
abuser, and a desire to protect him from sanctions.165  Thus, there is a definite 
likelihood that the woman who has been the victim of the very violence 
requiring police intervention will choose not to actively engage with the 
ensuing processing of the charge through the court system. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the emphasis on so-called 
“uncooperative victims” obscures the important fact that a great deal of women 
who report violence to the police do continue on and “cooperate” fully in the 
ensuing criminal prosecution.166  Nevertheless, the co-existing fact that many 
women do refuse to participate with the criminal prosecution of their violent 
male intimates, even after having initially called upon the police seeking 
intervention, causes considerable frustration, confusion, and resentment on the 
part of key players in the legal system (including police officers, 
prosecutors/Crown attorneys, and judges). 
In some cases, there is a tendency on the part of court personnel to 
characterize women who refuse to cooperate as “manipulative” or as having 
lied about the abuse in the first place.167  More generally, there is an explicit 
pinpointing of responsibility for the failure of domestic violence cases either to 
be processed fully or to result in a conviction, in the corresponding “failure” of 
the woman victim to assist the state by cooperating fully and testifying against 
the batterer.168  As two Canadian researchers point out, “prosecutors often 
explain low rates of prosecution by emphasizing that victims of domestic 
violence tend to change their minds about pressing charges, often recanting 
their testimonies and/or becoming “non-cooperative witnesses.”169  This type 
of argument may be advanced from either a sympathetic or a critical 
viewpoint, but in either case it paradoxically assumes that assaulted women 
have a disproportionate amount of power over the functioning of the criminal 
justice system. 
In any event, there is a perception that the women who are “reluctant” or 
“uncooperative” victims have not fulfilled their part of the bargain; in other 
words, they have enlisted the assistance of the state by calling upon the police 
for help but have then failed to follow through with the system’s subsequent 
 
 165. Bennett, supra note 163, at 764-69. 
 166. See, e.g., Dawson & Dinovitzer, supra note 164, at 610 (reporting that their review of 
criminal justice system processing of domestic violence cases in one specialized court in Toronto 
found that “approximately 55% of all victims cooperated with the prosecution”). 
 167. In a thoughtful article critically analysing the debates about mandated participation in 
domestic violence prosecutions, Cheryl Hanna relays stories of training fellow prosecutors about 
domestic violence and hearing reactions from her colleagues characterizing assaulted women 
reluctant to testify as “lying about the abuse or hiding something.”  Hanna, supra note 7, at 1882. 
 168. See id. at 1883. 
 169. Dawson & Dinovitzer, supra note 164, at 594. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
138 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:107 
requirements.170  The difficulty with this view, however, is that it assumes that 
the “system” can, and typically does, effectively respond to the needs of 
assaulted women.  Moreover, it fails to address the inadequacies in legal 
responses to domestic violence from the point of view of the woman whose 
rights it is supposed to protect.171 
B. Criminalizing “Bad” Victims 
Some of the discourse surrounding “uncooperative victims” has revolved 
around and is directly connected to larger debates about relatively recent legal 
interventions into domestic violence such as mandatory arrest and mandatory, 
or “no-drop,” prosecution policies.172  There is a deeply held assumption, 
certainly one which is understandable, that a critical component of the strategy 
aimed at deprivatizing domestic violence, assuming social responsibility for 
the problem, and holding abusers accountable, requires aggressive 
criminalization of the problem of domestic violence.173  Tied to this is the view 
that once contact with the police is made, abusers should be arrested and 
criminal prosecutions should be vigorously pursued.174  This, in fact, has 
become a cornerstone of contemporary legal responses to domestic violence, 
responses which are directly attributable to the advocacy efforts of those 
associated with social movements committed to ending violence in women’s 
lives.175 
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The debate about the merits of no-drop or mandatory prosecution in 
domestic violence cases is a complex one, with highly compelling arguments 
marshaled on each side of the divide.176  The crux of the matter is often seen to 
be the tension between a legitimate social interest in eradicating domestic 
violence through criminalization and the contradictions inherent in further 
disempowering already disempowered women whose lives have been damaged 
by the harmful effects of intimate violence, by stripping from them any choice 
in the decision to prosecute.177  My point is not to engage these arguments 
directly, but is instead to excavate the underlying assumptions which shape the 
discourse surrounding the role of so-called “uncooperative victims” in 
domestic violence cases in the criminal justice system. 
Some of the criminal law reforms made in the area of domestic violence 
prosecution address precisely the issue of women’s “reluctance” to “cooperate” 
in the court system.178  The most of important of these is the attempt to proceed 
with criminal prosecutions without reliance on the testimony of the victim by 
relying, for example, on other evidence such as 911 tapes, photographs of 
injuries, videotaped statements, and evidence from other witnesses (such as 
neighbours).179  This form of “enhanced” or “vigorous” prosecution has been 
formally implemented in jurisdictions such as San Diego and is also one of the 
models on which the specialized domestic violence courts in Ontario, Canada 
are premised.180  The efficacy of these reforms, however, and the extent to 
which they are actually operationalized has yet to be the subject of systematic 
or rigorous evaluation (although this has been repeatedly requested by 
community groups and other key stakeholders in Ontario). 
Because “uncooperative victims” are seen to pose such a powerful obstacle 
to the successful prosecution of domestic violence cases, significant attention 
has been paid to how they should be treated.181  Some jurisdictions allow for a 
variety of legal remedies to be taken against women who fail to appear and/or 
refuse to testify in domestic violence cases.182  One of the more disturbing of 
these is the punitive response witnessed in the attempt to criminalize women 
who refuse to appear or testify in domestic violence cases in which they are 
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victim-witnesses.183  On this approach, the very women who are victimized by 
intimate violence in the first place, and who struggle to cope with this violence 
to the best of their abilities, paradoxically themselves become victims of the 
coercive power of the criminal law. 
In the United States, in a well publicized case in Alaska in 1983,184 a 
woman was jailed for refusing to testify, a criminal justice system response 
which was subject to heated media debate.185  While this is hardly a 
widespread reality, there have been numerous similar incidents since that time 
in North America.186  Under a policy recently developed in the United 
Kingdom, the Crown Prosecution Service unveiled guidelines that are intended 
to see that domestic assaults are treated more seriously than random acts of 
violence.187  As part of that strategy, women who refuse to “cooperate” with 
prosecutions of domestic violence were officially put on notice that they may, 
in fact, find that they are themselves the subject of criminal prosecution.188  
Citing a study which reported that in eight out of ten times where criminal 
proceedings were dropped the reason was because the victim had “refused to 
co-operate,” this policy is supposed to demonstrate the “tough on crime” 
approach to combating domestic violence in Britain.189 
Arguments in favour of using the punitive powers of the criminal justice 
system against the very women who are the victims of domestic violence are 
premised on the idea that these “bad” victims need to be brought into line and 
compelled to assist the state.  But this idea utterly fails to come to grips with 
the costs associated with “engaging the state” faced by assaulted women and 
the negative repercussions such an engagement often entails.  As Elizabeth 
Schneider argues, the dilemma of the criminalization model in general – also 
seen in the dilemma of criminalizing battered women for “non-compliance” – 
is “the promise of an ‘autonomous liberal legal self’ which does not encompass 
the human and material experiences of women who are battered or take into 
account the gendered realities of their lives.”190 
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C. “Helpless” Victims and Unhelpful Witnesses: The Costs of Prosecutions 
on Women 
Women’s voices are relatively absent from legal scholarship on the impact 
and efficacy of legal system in relation to domestic violence, but an emerging 
literature does reveal some important findings.191  One of the most significant 
is that assaulted women are not a homogeneous group, and their reasons for 
their responses to the criminal justice system vary.192  In spite of this, distinct 
themes emerge both from the perceptions of Crown attorneys, prosecutors, 
victim advocates, police officers, and other system personnel about assaulted 
women’s reactions and, more importantly, from the small but important body 
of research in this area documenting women’s own experiences within the 
criminal justice system.193  One of these is the tension between many assaulted 
women’s fear of her violent male intimate and the corresponding levels of fear 
and/or distrust of the criminal justice system.194  Essentially, in trying to devise 
a survival strategy in the face of intimate violence, women’s experiences of the 
criminal justice system reflect a deep ambivalence about its ability to offer a 
remedy that does not extract more from them than whatever relief or solution it 
potentially offers. 
Studies of assaulted women’s reactions to the criminal justice system in 
Canada show a fairly high degree of support for mandatory arrest but a 
significantly lower level of support for mandatory prosecution of domestic 
violence cases.195  Why is this?  One reason appears to lie in the assessments 
individual women make about the investment their participation requires 
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against the outcome it entails,196 as it is essentially a paradigmatically rational 
cost-benefit analysis. 
A British study, for example, based on interviews with assaulted women, 
found that for some of them the cost was often not worth the sentence.197  As 
Carolyn Hoyle explains, in these cases, “victims made rational choices, within 
the constraints as they perceived them.”198  The three main reasons offered for 
not wanting police intervention and/or not wanting to assist with criminal 
prosecutions were as follows: 
Some women did not want to break up the relationship or the family unit; 
secondly some were afraid of further retaliatory violence; and thirdly, some did 
not think that the likely sentence would be worth the “costs” incurred by the 
process.  All three reasons concern the high costs, of various sorts, that victims 
can incur by supporting a prosecution.199 
In other words, the toll taken by participating in the criminal justice system 
would not be compensated by a sentence sufficiently serious to have made the 
effort worth it.  Clearly this latter concern is quite an indictment of the criminal 
justice system response to domestic violence from the eyes of those it is 
supposed to serve. 
Even the typically cited fear of reprisal as a reason for “non-cooperation” 
implicitly reveals a concern with the state’s failure and/or inability to protect 
assaulted women from further or escalated violence.  Studies have found that 
this fear is, in fact, a major reason cited for electing not to pursue or assist with 
criminal prosecution of batterers.200  And, given that it has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that assaulted women are at greatest risk for violence and murder 
upon separating from violent male intimates, the fear of reprisal is often 
sufficient to deter an assaulted woman from pursuing prosecution and to keep 
her in a relationship with a violent man. 
The trouble with the idea of the “uncooperative victim,” then, is that the 
criminal justice system processing of domestic violence cases, with all of the 
critically important innovations and reforms which have been and continue to 
be implemented remains, in many instances, at odds with the needs of women 
coping with violence perpetrated by their male intimates.  What is needed, 
therefore, is a reframe of the idea of the “uncooperative victim” or “reluctant 
witness,” one that shifts the object of the inquiry away from the woman’s 
responses and onto the barriers which interfere with and/or limit the possibility 
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of a successful prosecution.  In this way, by changing the focus and adjusting 
the lens of the inquiry, it becomes possible to understand that the choices made 
by a so-called “uncooperative victim,” in many instances, may be quite rational 
and reasonable ones given the particular circumstances of her life. 
D. Enhancing the Likelihood of Prosecution Without Criminalizing Women 
Who Are Reluctant Witnesses 
Given that “legal remedies are an essential tool in stopping domestic 
violence,”201 at least part of the state’s response will continue be a 
criminalization strategy.  The role of the assaulted woman as victim-witness, 
therefore, will also continue to be a pivotal one.  A study from Toronto’s K 
court, a specialized court established to process domestic violence cases, found 
that a case is seven times more likely to be prosecuted if the Crown perceives 
the woman to be a “cooperative” witness.202  But the question of what to do 
about the “reluctant witness” and/or the “uncooperative victim” in this context 
should be reposed to focus on what can be done to enhance the possibility of 
successfully prosecuting cases of domestic violence, which in turn entails 
ongoing and critical scrutiny of the system itself. 
One of the studies of assaulted women’s experiences with the criminal 
justice system found that  “the major reasons for willingness to cooperate with 
the criminal processing system were (1) stopping the abusive behaviour . . . 
followed by (2) sending a message that the behaviour is criminal . . . , and (3) 
punishing the abuser.”203  The first reason goes back to and requires a belief 
that the criminal justice system will actually provide an effective interruption 
into men’s violence against women in intimate relationships.  This belief can 
only be bolstered by the second and third reasons cited by the women 
interviewed, namely that a conviction will ensue to which a serious penalty 
will attach. 
The same study showed that women’s level of satisfaction with criminal 
justice system personnel was highest for victim assistance staff.204  Other 
studies have confirmed the critically important role of advocates within the 
criminal justice system whose role is to inform victim-witnesses about the 
nature of the proceedings and support them throughout.  For example, one 
study of the processing of domestic violence cases in Toronto found that a 
woman is three times more likely to be willing to testify and thereby aid the 
prosecution, if she met with someone from Victim Witness Program.205  Other 
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research has confirmed this same thing.  “Battered women who receive 
advocacy services . . . are more likely than others to continue their case 
through to conviction.”206 
This points to the need for more resources within the criminal justice 
system to respond to the complexities and challenges these kinds of cases pose.  
As one commentator points out, 
If the prosecutor adopts a policy of aggressively prosecuting abuse cases but 
fails to provide victim advocacy services to maintain contact with the victims, 
attend to their safety needs and help them to understand the law enforcement 
system, then the prosecutor often is doomed to frustration because the victims 
of abuse are less likely to remain available to testify.207 
Widening the lens further still, a range of other legal reforms are required 
to deal with domestic violence, some of which are being implemented, and 
some of which are still to be devised.  Along with these reforms, constant 
evaluation of our efforts to respond to domestic violence through legal means 
must be undertaken, in order to assess the efficacy of these reform and of the 
system overall.  Wider still, we must keep in mind that legal responses to 
domestic violence can only ever be a part of a broader strategy aimed at ending 
a deeply entrenched and multiply constituted social problem such as men’s 
violence against women and children. 
E. Uncooperative Victims and Women’s Agency 
As Cheryl Hanna points out, “the question of what the battered woman’s 
role in the prosecution process ought to be often masks ambivalence about 
what her role in the abusive relationship is.”208  She also points to 
characterizations of what a “real” or “ideal” victim of domestic violence is and 
how she behaves.209  As Hanna continues: 
Women who want to follow through with prosecution are seen either as the 
true victims of domestic violence or as manipulators with an agenda.  Women 
who do not want to proceed are characterized either as agents in the battering – 
allowing it to continue because of their lack of cooperation with the state – or 
as true victims who have “learned helplessness.”210 
The “uncooperative victim,” then, like those afflicted with the “battered 
woman syndrome,” is part of the complex “image problem” assaulted women 
have in relation to legal responses to domestic violence. 
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In each of these cases, the image problem regarding “victims” reflects the 
difficulty reconciling victimization with agency, a difficulty also reflected in 
law.  Either the “uncooperative victim” is entirely helpless and fails to appear 
or refuses to testify about the abuse because she is paralyzed by fear and is 
thereby a “true victim,” utterly without agency, or the “uncooperative victim” 
is a lying manipulator, expressing an excess of agency by exerting her will in 
refusing to assist the prosecution, and thereby negates her status as a true 
victim.  Even her credibility is in doubt, as perhaps she is to blame for what 
happened all along.  The “uncooperative victim,” therefore, like the “battered 
woman” with the “battered woman syndrome,” exemplifies the polarized and 
antithetical extremes of the split between victim and agent in representations of 
assaulted women. 
V.  RECONCILING THE VICTIM / AGENT DICHOTOMY IN 
LEGAL ACCOUNTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A. Reifying Victims/Obliterating Agency 
Within broader discourses surrounding violence against women is the 
tendency to define women who have experienced violence exclusively in terms 
of this experience, a tendency sharply evident in dominant images of the 
“victims” of domestic violence.  It is as if women’s experiences of violence 
define something essential about who they are, as if being a victim becomes an 
identity in and of itself.  Yet this category – “victim” – is one with which most 
women do not identify, and in which most women do not want to recognize 
themselves and their own lives.211  As Elizabeth Stanko observes, 
Creating a category “victim” is one way of dealing with women’s experiences 
of male violence.  The role and status of “victim” is separate from that of all 
women.  “Victimism”, the practice of objectifying women’s experiences of 
male violence, serves to deny the commonality among sexually and/or 
physically assaulted women . . . .212 
For example, in the commonly used descriptor “battered woman,” 
universalizing, homogenizing, and static tendencies inhere.  In fact, a 
caricature of the “battered woman” as a particular type of “victim” is embodied 
within the “battered woman syndrome.”  Not only does it suggest that there is a 
uniformity to women’s experiences of physical abuse in their intimate 
heterosexual relationships, it also linguistically constructs a category of 
women – battered women – who are defined in terms of the violence done to 
them, and who, as a result, are assumed to be in some fundamental way 
different and separate from all other (“normal”/non-battered) women. 
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Researcher Donileen Loseke describes the gap between “official” 
definitions (and associated images) of “battered women” and the subjective 
labeling of experience on the part of women she interviewed who stayed at a 
shelter for assaulted women in the United States.213  Loseke writes that “it 
sometimes seemed that women preferred any label other than ‘batterer’ for 
their partners and any label other than ‘abused wife’ for themselves.”214  As 
she explains, 
[O]fficial definitions might not encourage social members to use these images 
as interpretive devices in the complex process of naming individual troubles.  
Just as most violence as experienced is not obviously the type defined as “wife 
abuse” [that is, violence in its most extreme and brutal forms], the morally 
condemned “killer drunk” image of drinking drivers does not match subjective 
interpretations where such persons often seem to be merely “social drinkers” 
who drive without luck.215 
This resistance to seeing oneself as a “victim” of violence may very well be 
directly linked to the more troubling aspects of the prevailing representation of 
the category, in particular its attendant associations with utter helplessness and 
passivity.  In this construction, women’s strengths, survival skills, and 
strategies of resistance are rendered invisible because the dichotomous 
opposition of passive-victim/active-agent cannot accommodate victimization 
and resistance within the same conceptual framework.216  Articulating this 
dilemma in terms of her own refusal of the category “battered woman,” 
feminist legal scholar Martha Mahoney reveals that one of the experiences of 
violence relayed in her article theorizing legal images of battered woman is her 
own.217  But, she takes pains to emphasize that: 
I do not feel like a “battered woman.”  Really, I want to say that I am not, since 
the phrase conjures up an image that fails to describe either my marriage or my 
sense of myself.  It is a difficult claim to make for several reasons: the gap 
between my self-perceived competence and strength and my own image of 
battered women, the inevitable attendant loss of my own denial of painful 
experience, and the certainty that the listener cannot hear such a claim without 
filtering it through a variety of derogatory stereotypes.218 
Mahoney’s sudden and unexpected insertion of her own experience of violence 
in an intimate relationship, into her scholarly text analysing legal images of 
battered women, is a powerful and courageous discursive maneuver.  It is an 
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intervention which effectively disrupts and then subverts the “us/them” 
dichotomy which implicitly runs through so much of the writing on violence 
against women by academics and “experts.” 
In fact, in the same article, Mahoney addresses the way in which 
professional distancing from the problem of domestic violence occurs in the 
legal system, as elsewhere, through a dominant ideology that denies the 
profound and personal impacts of oppression.219  This is a form of the denial, 
silence, and minimization which so often takes place in society at large about 
the subject of violence against women and children, as if it is an unfortunate or 
impolite topic of conversation, as if it is something which affects other people, 
not “us.”  This denial also manifests itself within courtrooms as well as in the 
professional and scholarly discourses on the topic.220  As Mahoney points out: 
“[D]espite the statistics on the epidemic incidence of domestic violence, there 
is almost no legal or social science scholarship that describes an author’s 
experience of violence or even indicates that the author has had any such 
experience.”221  Yet “it is unlikely,” she notes wryly, “that a disinterested body 
of social scientists is doing all this research.”222 
However, the idea persists that there exists a distinct category of women, 
identifiable by their experiences of physical assault in intimate relationships 
and the psychological effects of this violence.223  It is visible in the very ease 
with which the category “battered women” is deployed, especially in the legal 
and psychological literature on the topic.224  This classification is widely and 
easily used as if it speaks to a particular class of women. 
It is commonly heard in popular discourse, including in the media where 
there are countless instances and examples.  For example, in a CBC radio 
interview on the inquest recently completed in Ontario into the deaths of a 
number of “battered women,”225 the reporter discussed the death of Arlene 
Mays, a woman whose common law spouse killed her after subjecting her to 
ongoing and escalating violence, and after every avenue of escape she had tried 
(including legal interventions and restraining orders) had failed to protect 
her.226  In responding to the CBC interviewer’s question, the reporter 
emphasized that “we” must understand how the system failed “women like 
this,” indicating through this turn of phrase, that there is an identifiable type of 
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woman who needs “help” from “the system.”227  Note that the reporter did not 
refer to women who find themselves in a situation like this with a violent and 
dangerous man or use some other such phrase that would engage a very 
different representation of the same event.228  This is no mere terminological 
quibble.  Instead the reporter’s choice of language, “women like this,” speaks 
volumes about the unarticulated assumptions which pervade popular 
representations of violence against women and which play on implicit 
(sometimes explicit) stereotypes about which women and which “types” of 
women get battered. 
Even many feminist writers deploy the category and language of “victims” 
uncritically, as if it were possible to speak of, analyse, and describe a sub-set of 
the female population that are victimized and brutalized by men in the 
“privacy” of their intimate heterosexual relationships and that to whom 
services, policy initiatives, and most of all, sympathy should be extended.  
However well meaning, there is usually an implicit sub-text operating in 
writings that address the needs, experiences or issues facing “battered women.”  
It is that “they” are not us. 
The language used to describe women who have experienced battering, 
therefore, is often problematic at best, patronizing at worst.  In addition to the 
descriptions of “battered women” as helpless and passive advanced through the 
use “battered woman syndrome,” some writers inadvertently reveal an attitude 
of condescension towards women who have been assaulted.229  Donald Downs, 
for example, advances an analysis purportedly sympathetic to the dilemmas 
facing women who are assaulted.230  Although he is harshly critical of the 
“battered woman syndrome” precisely because it denigrates women, in one 
part of his book he writes that “battered women may have broken wings.”231  
While he is obviously speaking metaphorically here, through this language 
Downs is nevertheless guilty of evoking the stereotypical image of the 
damaged and “broken” “battered woman,” an image he ostensibly seeks to 
overcome. 
The very notion, therefore, that there exists a profile of a typical “battered 
woman” carries with it an implicit separation of women into groups, as they 
are divided into those who have been victimized in this way and those who 
have not. This not only homogenizes the diversity of women (from all age, 
ethnic, cultural, and socio-economic strata) who have experienced violence in 
an intimate relationship with a male partner, but it also stigmatizes those 
women identified as “victims” of this violence and discourages women from 
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disclosing their experiences for fear of this stigmatization.  Mahoney’s 
hesitations expressed immediately after identifying her own history of violence 
speaks powerfully to this dilemma.232 
Dominant narratives commonly deployed to describe violence against 
women tend to engage in a totalizing discourse on “victims.”  Through the use 
of the “battered woman syndrome,” for example, the woman’s status as 
“victim” becomes reified.  She is at once defined – the “battered woman” – 
entirely in terms of her relationship to the man’s violence against her and at the 
same time pathologized through a psychological account of her incapacity and 
paralysis.  In this way, an enduring stereotype of the “battered woman” is 
constructed, one which lumps together women from an incredible diversity of 
life situations, unites them solely by virtue of the commonality of the 
experience of violence perpetrated by their male partners, and obliterates 
recognition of their resistance, agency, and survival skills in one fell swoop. 
B. Blaming “Battered Women” for “Failing to Exit:”233 Rendering 
Inequality Invisible 
The popular and legal preoccupation with women’s “failure” to leave, or 
what Martha Mahoney calls “exit,”234 obscures the conditions of inequality in 
women’s lives which make the “freedom” to leave chimerical.  For example, 
recent research suggests that of women who have ended relationships with 
violent male partners, approximately one third will be assaulted again by these 
same ex-partners, demonstrating that leaving the relationship is no guarantee of 
ending the violence.235  Similarly, using the criminal justice system is no 
guarantee of ending the violence in women’s lives, not only because the 
system often cannot deliver on its promise to keep women safe, but also 
because violent men often retaliate against women who report to police and/or 
who testify in court.  Seen in this light, the decisions made by assaulted women 
who are “uncooperative victims” make much more sense. 
Indeed, in sharp contrast to the prevailing social belief that if a woman 
simply “leaves” her abusive male intimate she can thereby exercise control and 
stop the violence, women are at highest risk for being killed in the aftermath of 
separation.236  In Canada, a spate of highly publicized intimate femicides 
occurred in Ontario in the summer of 2000, making this point painfully clear, 
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and prompting much media discussion about domestic violence and murder.237  
What is most striking about these highly visible cases – one of which involved 
a woman being fatally shot after handing her baby over to neighbours who 
attempted to intervene to save her – is not only that the women had already left 
their abusive spouses but also that they had repeatedly called upon a variety of 
state agencies and services, including the police, for assistance and 
protection.238  This speaks to what some commentators have described as the 
“rhetoric of protection” offered by the state239 to women survivors of sexual 
violence.240 
This expectation that women should simply leave, combined with the 
profound inadequacy of support services, legal protection, and economic 
resources available to them, creates another classic double bind for women: if 
they “stay,” they are blamed for the violence and not doing anything about it, 
but if they “leave” they are often at greater risk for more violence or even 
death.  Yet this expectation of “exit” not only permeates popular consciousness 
and discourse surrounding the problem of violence in intimate relationships, it 
also deeply affects legal images of women who have been assaulted241 and 
shapes legal responses to the problem in a number of ways. 
Christine Littleton observes how this operates in legal arenas to women’s 
detriment: 
In Walker’s account of learned helplessness, the cause (random, uncontrollable 
violence inflicted by men) is at least part of the “syndrome.”  In the case law, 
the cause disappears while the syndrome remains.  In neither case, however, is 
the focus explicitly and continuously placed where it belongs – on the 
intolerable conditions under which women live.242 
As Littleton argues, through the “battered woman syndrome,” women’s 
victimization becomes transformed into something about the women 
themselves and allows the legal system to avoid grappling with the 
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fundamental dynamics of men’s violence, men’s greater social power and 
gender inequalities.243 
In an impossible double bind, women’s resistance strategies are not seen 
by a model like the “battered woman syndrome” which stresses women’s 
passivity and immobilization.  Yet women are expected to resist in so far as the 
requirement that women “leave” relationships with men in which they are 
battered is a widely held conviction and expectation.  And at the same time, if 
they resist too much, or in the wrong area, for example, by exerting their will 
by choosing not to proceed with or facilitate a criminal domestic violence 
prosecution, they are punished and viewed as “uncooperative” and/or “bad” 
victims. 
The idea that if assaulted women do not “leave” they are culpable and 
complicit in the violence perpetrated against them is evident in the popularity 
of the concern about why “battered” women “stay” with men who assault them 
and the oft-heard question “why doesn’t she just leave?”  As Martha Mahoney 
explains: 
Once exit is defined as the appropriate response to abuse, then staying can be 
treated as evidence that abuse never happened.  If abuse is asserted, “failure” 
to exit must then be explained.  When that “failure” becomes the point of 
inquiry, explanation in law and popular culture tends to emphasize 
victimization and implicitly deny agency in the person who has been 
harmed.244 
In culture and in law, then, the idea that women always can, and always 
should, simply “leave” reflects a view that sees agency without seeing the 
limits on the scope of this very agency imposed by the conditions of inequality. 
The social expectation that women should “leave” violent men also 
obscures a range of other perhaps more important and compelling questions.  
For example, what kinds of social and economic policies and resources would 
make this option not merely an abstract possibility but a materially viable one 
for women assaulted by their male intimates? What other kinds of 
interventions might work to end the man’s violence against his female partner?  
Why doesn’t he leave?  Why are the current social interventions still aimed at 
supporting her departure (i.e. the provision, inadequate as it is, of shelters for 
assaulted women)?  If answers to these questions were seriously engaged, we 
would already be a considerable distance closer to eradicating men’s violence 
against women and eliminating the social conditions in which is produced and 
reproduced. 
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C. Widening the Lens and Transcending Dualisms: Seeing Agency and 
Subordination in Women’s Experiences of Violence 
Martha Mahoney’s acerbic observation that battered women have an 
“image problem” in terms of how they are represented and constructed in the 
legal system, perhaps most pointedly and eloquently captures the essence of 
the problems surrounding legal responses to domestic violence.245  Speaking 
specifically about the ways in which these representations impose 
contradictions and hazards for “battered women” who are engaged in custody 
battles with their violent male spouses for their children, Mahoney delineates 
the double-edged sword women face in terms of legal expectations.246  As she 
explains: 
We need to be strong, resourceful, effective as a parent, meeting the needs of 
the children when we appear in court.  On the other hand, if we do that too 
well, the court may disbelieve our stories because of stereotypes held by 
judges or psychologists.  If the court will consider violence as a factor at all in 
custody decisions, we may be seen as – or in effect be required to appear as – 
having been weak, helpless, and economically dependent to have “stayed” with 
the man all these years.247 
These “image problems” have far wider manifestations in law and in culture.  
They speak to the radical individualization of experience and the systemic 
denial of patterns and relations of social domination.  This occurs not only in 
terms of the social problem of men’s violence against women, but also in other 
struggles waged to prove and protest inequality and discrimination. 
The law’s relationship to complex social problems like violence against 
women, then, is both critically important while it remains fundamentally 
flawed.  For as much as the law is a potent force for the realization of social 
change and a necessary vehicle through which to advocate and struggle for 
reform, the legal system continues to be mired in and shaped by the unequal 
relations of gender, class, and race248 in which it seeks to intervene. 
While understanding the pervasive social problem of violence against 
women necessarily entails a recognition of the profound and often brutal ways 
in which women are subordinated, a complete apprehension of this 
phenomenon in women’s lives at both the macro and micro levels also requires 
attention to the ways in which women seek to resist this violence.  A failure to 
acknowledge the ways in which women cope with, struggle against, and resist 
the violence perpetrated against them risks defining women in terms of the 
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violence done to them and renders them objects of this violence rather than 
subjects in relation to it. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As Elizabeth Schneider has recently argued in her book, Battered Women 
and Feminist Lawmaking: 
[T]he contradictions of victimization are particularly profound in the area of 
gender.  Victim claims are the only way that women are heard, yet they trigger 
entrenched stereotypes of passivity and purity . . . concepts of agency are also 
limited and problematic.  Traditional views of agency are based on notions of 
individual choice and responsibility, individual will and action – perceptions of 
atomized individuals, acting alone, unconstrained by social forces, unmediated 
by social structures and systemic hardship.”249 
These tensions are clearly visible in a critical exposition of the categories 
of victims that underpin the “battered woman syndrome” and the 
“uncooperative victim” in domestic violence cases. 
The “battered woman syndrome” and the related concept of “learned 
helplessness” fails to grasp the ways in which women who are assaulted are 
often not at all incapacitated but are active in struggling against the violence.  
Furthermore, these concepts individualize and psychologize what is 
fundamentally a social and political problem with which women must contend 
in the specific contexts of their individual lives.  In this way, the “battered 
woman syndrome” and “learned helplessness” models are ultimately both 
decontextualized and individualized formulations of women’s experiences and 
are severed from an analysis of the deeper structures of sexual inequality.  The 
use of the “battered woman syndrome” has shed light in legal contexts on 
many of the profound psychological consequences of ongoing subjection to 
violence in an intimate relationship.  Yet it is premised on a depiction of 
battered women as immobilized by the effects of the violence they have 
suffered and fails to take into account the many creative, resourceful, and 
ongoing ways in which women actively resist the violence perpetrated against 
them.  Fundamentally, then, it is by definition precluded from grasping the 
reasonableness of an act of homicide perpetrated to defend against a fear of 
being killed – a quintessential expression of agency in the context of 
victimization some assaulted women make when confronted with threats 
against their own lives. 
Similarly, those women who are labeled as “uncooperative victims,” are 
often seen as lacking credibility, “using” the system, difficult, and even 
“manipulative.”  They are not seen as reasonable actors who may have 
extremely legitimate reasons for assessing the situation as one which does not 
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reflect their assessment of their best interests and their own safety.  Similar to 
the “battered woman syndrome,” this depiction fails to question the causes and 
consequences of the violence.  Moreover, it embodies a corresponding 
tendency to drop social context out of accounts of violence that remain 
radically individualized.  Finally, this depiction rests on an erroneous 
assumption that legal responses, especially in terms of the criminal justice 
system are, while perhaps needing some fine tuning, fundamentally appropriate 
and adequate to the task of dealing with domestic violence. 
As Schneider points out in relation to legal responses to domestic violence, 
“the enormous credibility problems that women face as complainants and 
witnesses seem almost insurmountable.”250  This is another way of invoking 
the “image problems” assaulted women face in legal responses to domestic 
violence.  One of the fundamental ways in which we can move towards 
eliminating these credibility problems is to discard images of victims of 
domestic violence which fail to reflect a more adequate understanding of the 
socially produced and individually lived nature of the problem.  We need, 
among other things, theoretical frameworks of violence in women’s lives 
which are more focused on women’s strengths, resilience, and resistance as a 
way to correct the pathologizing and stigmatizing discourses which construct 
women as damaged, helpless, and irrational victims, as in the “battered woman 
syndrome,” or as irrational and undeserving victims, as in the “uncooperative 
victim.”  Finally, we need a critical interrogation of the efficacy of the criminal 
justice system response to domestic violence and its victims and a willingness 
to address the discordance between its bureaucratic and procedural needs and 
the needs of complex assaulted women.  Only through more nuanced, 
contextual accounts of the conditions of the lives of the women who are 
victimized by domestic violence can we develop more effective policy and 
legal interventions to deal with the problem of violence against women at both 
the macro and the micro levels. 
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